From his powerful Twitter, Alvaro Uribe has been insistently criticizing the”concessions” of Santos to the FARC, in the framework of the negotiations inHavana, contrasting it with his peace process with the paramilitaries. However,when it’s reviewed what Uribe initially proposed to the paramilitaries, before theConstitutional Court corrected the most controversial of the Justice and Peace Law,it comes to the conclusion that his offers are similar to these “concessions” whichare the subject of his relentless criticism.

From his powerful Twitter, Alvaro Uribe has been insistently criticizing the”concessions” of Santos to the FARC, in the framework of the negotiations inHavana, contrasting it with his peace process with the paramilitaries. However,when it’s reviewed what Uribe initially proposed to the paramilitaries, before theConstitutional Court corrected the most controversial of the Justice and Peace Law,it comes to the conclusion that his offers are similar to these “concessions” whichare the subject of his relentless criticism.

1. on the cessation of hostilities

What is defended now

In September of last year, Uribe said it was a mistake to advance a peace processwith the FARC without requiring a cessation of hostilities. Although he did not makea detailed presentation of his argument, the ex-president said he felt it was amistake because the FARC ‘kill the Colombians and continue dialogue “. Two weeksafter the finalization of the unilateral ceasefire that the FARC declared betweenNovember 20 of last year and January 20 of this, the former president asked thegovernment to suspend the negotiations in Havana after separate attacks from theguerrilla in southern Bolivar and Norte de Santander and Antioquia.

What was defended before

When negotiating with the paramilitaries in Santafé de Ralito (Córdoba), Uribe diddemand as a condition a unilateral declaration of cessation of hostilities on the partof the AUC, which they accepted. After a year, Human Rights Observatoryof theGovernment stressed the importance of the truce, announcing that the number of massacres had been reduced by one third. However, in February 2004 a reportfrom the Government itself showed that, after 14 months of negotiations, the paramilitary groups had committed nothing less than 362 murders, 16 massacresand 180 abductions. Only that at that time the violation of the cessation of hostilities did not make Uribe call into question the continuity of the process.

 

2. on Impunity

What is defended now

This is the point where Uribe has insisted the most. It could be said that it is hisfundamental criticism to the negotiations in Havana, as he made it clear on the eveof the march of April 9: “Our opposition to the peace process is not to peace but toimpunity”. The questions have been essentially two: that there is not going to beprosecution of the heads of the demobilized FARC and that there will be no prisonfor perpetrators of heinous crimes, by use of selectivity criteria and prioritization inthe judicial processes referred to in the Framework for Peace.

 

What was defended before

Uribe has said that his famous Law of Justice and Peace is shielded againstimpunity, since it does not contemplate amnesties or pardons. Nevertheless, inpractice a wide margin allowed amnesty de facto since the combatants that at themoment they lay down the weapons did not to have an openedprocess or acondemnation against them, they could remain free taking refuge in the decree 128of 2003. This way, very few had to pay jailtime (Indepaz has indicated that only 2%). In addition, this demobilized group was not forced to testify before judicialinstances about other crimes of their knowledge, propitiating for countless atrociouscrimes to remain uninvestigated.

On the other hand, the alternative penalties contemplated in Justice and Peace,granted to the demobilized with sentences, have five as minimum and maximumeight years, “a disproportionately benign duration given the gravity of the crimescommitted, in some cases, tortures, disappearance, violation or massacre ”, asobserves the constitutionalist Manuel Fernando Quinche, author of a book on thetopic. In addition to this, the original project of Justice and Peace suggested that aspart of the fulfillment of the condemnation to count the 18 months that lasted the  “zones of concentration” of paramilitary, established while they were advancing thenegotiations in Santafé de Ralito. This is something that the Constitutional Courteventually eliminated.

 

3. on the compensation to the victims

What is defended now

The former president has also attempted to seize the spokesman role for thevictims facing the peace process with the FARC. As a development of his previouscriticismhe stated: “atrocious crimes will go unpunished, because selectivity andprioritization are not being investigated, leaving then the victims uncompensated,abad example”. For him, his process with the paramilitaries it is indeed a goodexample of reparation to the victims.

 

What was defended before

The punishment of the murderer is one of the most important forms of reparationto victims, but as shown, Uribe was in favor that the vast majority of perpetratorsand accomplices of crimes were not convicted or prosecuted in exchange for their demobilization.

There are also other forms of reparation, among them the monetary compensationfor the harm suffered. In the case of the negotiation with the ‘paramilitaries’, it wassuggested that this repair would be funded primarily with the assets of thedemobilized condemned, what was already a restriction by the low number of convictions that they were going to give. But in addition in the Justice and PeaceLaw of Uribe, two additional conditions were included: that the condemned wouldprovide their assets for repair “if any”, and that only would be taken into accountthe assets acquired illegally and not all their legacy.

In 2006 the Court knocked down both of these conditions, because according totheir concept they strongly limited repair possibilities.

 

4. on political participation

What is defended now

n a recent interview, Uribe expressed his disagreement with the offering of politicaleligibility to the FARC after having incurred in “abductions, killings of children, drugtrafficking and other heinous crimes”. As the former president believes that theFARC are a group “terrorist”, he incidentally also questions the political legitimacythat they may have to discuss the future of economic sectors such as agriculture,which is the subject on the agenda in Havana. “What if our government had donethat with the paramilitaries? “, has been asked.

 

What was defended before

In reality, discussing an agenda of reforms with the paramilitaries would had notbeen in the same direction to do so as with guerrilla insurgents. Primarily becausethe latter proposed the radical transformation of the State while the former doesnot. The paramilitaries were born as a counterinsurgency initiative in favor of theState to strengthen its military apparatus to combat the guerrillas, something thatin fact was already happening with the “Democratic Security” of Uribe.

Also, during the Uribe government he repeatedly stated that it should not be deniedthe political offense to the paramilitaries, and even initially the article 71 of the Lawof Justice and Peace made it effective. As the political offense of sedition isexcluded from the scheme of disabilities to aspire to public office, that way Uribeopened a door to the eligibility policy of the paramilitaries. Only that in the end thiswas never realized because the Constitutional Court knocked down that article onprocedural grounds.

 

Periodista/Practicante en La Silla Vacía